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This study analyzes a national survey of U.S. hog producers within a principal-agent framework 
in order to examine factors affecting contractor and grower success in hog contracting. Several 
factors had differential impacts on contractor and grower returns. Results suggest that there may 
be a role for public policy in ensuring that contract arrangements are conducted fairly. 
                                                 
1 Economists with the Resource Economics Division, ERS.    
2 The opinions and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the 
views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.   2 
Introduction 
The hog industry has rapidly consolidated during the 1980s and 90s.  The four largest hog 
slaughter firms accounted for 54 percent of total commercial hog slaughter in 1997, up from 40 
percent in 1990 and 34 percent in 1980 (USDA, GIPSA).  Hogs marketed from operations 
producing 50,000 head or more increased from 18 percent in 1994 to 38 percent in 1997, while 
hogs marketed from operations producing 500,000 head or more increased from 10 to 24 percent 
(Lawrence, Grimes, and Hyenga).  A key element of this rapid restructuring of the hog industry 
was the widespread growth of contract marketing and production arrangements.  Marketing 
contracts between packers and large hog operations ensure a large and stable volume of uniform 
type hogs for packers and reduce the market price risk for large hog producers.  To deliver the 
volume of hogs desired by packers and to achieve economies of size in hog production, large 
operations (i.e. contractors) often recruit many smaller operations (i.e. growers) to produce hogs 
under production contracts. 
 
Public concern about these arrangements in the hog industry stem from the increasing market 
power concentrated among packers and large hog operations (Hyenga, Harl, and Lawrence).  
Marketing contract arrangements between packers and large operations insulate large producers 
from some of the hog price variation in the “spot market” to which most small independent 
producers are subjected.  Also, because terms of production contracts are often complex and 
because the non-market benefits such as risk reduction, transportation costs, coordination 
services, or credit provisions are not readily transparent, it can be difficult for producers to 
evaluate the benefits from production contracts.  As contracts become more prevalent and as the 
hog industry becomes increasingly concentrated, it is possible that large operations will use their   3 
bargaining power and the opaque nature of contracts to extract more of the economic surplus 
from contract arrangements at the expense of the contract growers. 
 
This study examines the use of production contacts in the hog industry by casting hog 
contracting in a principle-agent framework and identifying factors that have affected financial 
performance in hog contracting.  Specifically, this study empirically examines: (1) What 
characteristics of hog contracts, hog operations, and contract participants are associated with 
financial performance in the hog contract relationship?; and (2) Do the factors affecting financial 
performance differ for the contractor and the grower, as might be expected in a principle-agent 
relationship?  These results should identify potential issues of conflict in the contract 
arrangement and could be useful in defining a role for public policy, if any, in ensuring that these 
business arrangements are conducted fairly. 
 
Background 
In a typical production contract arrangement for hog finishing, the owner of feeder pigs (i.e. 
contractor) engages a producer (i.e. grower) to take custody of the pigs and finish them in the 
producer’s facilities.  The contractor most often furnishes feed and veterinary services.  The 
grower usually receives from the contractor a fee for services, and in many cases some 
performance incentive (Rhodes). While the use of contract production has increased among all 
producer types, these arrangements have been predominately used among specialized feeder pig, 
weanling, and finished hog producers.  
   4 
Contractors are a diverse group that can have various types of business organizations, but the 
type of contractor most responsible for the rapid growth of hog contracting is the integrator.  An 
integrator is mainly responsible for coordinating the production from many different growers. 
This usually involves supplying feed to several different production sites (i.e. grower 
operations), and moving animals from site to site and to the processor as the animals move 
through each stage of production.  Input suppliers or packers are other types of contractors that 
may use contract production to vertically integrate business activities, such as feed or hog 
processing.  Farmers can also be contractors that employ other farmers as growers in order to 
expand or specialize their hog operation. 
 
Contract production is regarded as an effective means for the contractor to achieve economies of 
size in hog production while requiring minimal capital and labor.  In a survey of large hog 
contractors, the increased financial leverage resulting from substituting grower capital for 
contractor capital was the most frequently mentioned advantage of contract production 
arrangements (Lawrence, Grimes, and Hayenga).  Other important advantages mentioned in the 
survey were the mitigation of environmental/regulatory problems and the sourcing of quality 
labor.  The loss of operational control was the leading disadvantage reported by contractors, 
followed by increased production costs.  Having to pay for grower assets and disagreements with 
growers were also cited by contractors as important disadvantages of contract production. 
 
Growers have embraced contracting as a means of reducing risk, accessing capital, and 
stabilizing income.  Survey results suggest that risk reduction is the leading reason that producers 
enter into contract arrangements, followed by lack of capital and the need for more income   5 
(Wind-Norton and Kliebenstein).  Several studies have demonstrated that risk-averse producers 
would prefer contracting to independent production (Martin; Johnson and Foster; Parcell and 
Langemeir).  However, there is a risk/expected-return tradeoff involved with hog production 
contracts and an important part of this tradeoff is the loss of control by growers.  Operational 
control has several dimensions with regard to contract production, such as management 
responsibilities, contract incentives, and contract duration. There is evidence showing that for 
some hog producers, autonomy was more important than risk reduction in selecting between 
contract and independent business arrangements (Gillespie and Eidman).  This may explain in 
part why the growth of contracting has varied among different areas of the country, and why new 




Hog Contracting in a Principle-Agent Framework 
The principle-agent framework, in which the grower can be viewed as an agent of the contractor, 
has been used to model incentives associated with contracting (Stiglitz; Sappington; Sheldon).  
This approach recognizes that the interests of the parties in an agreement can diverge, and that 
incentive mechanisms to maximize performance are difficult to construct when the inputs (e.g. 
effort) and/or outputs (e.g. product quality) of the agent are not observable by the principle.  
Problems that the principle-agent approach seeks to model include the issue of disagreements 
(different agendas), mismanagement, insufficient motivation, and financial risk.  These are many 
of the disadvantages of contracting reported by large-scale contractors and growers (Lawrence, 
Grimes, and Hayenga; Hennessy and Lawrence).   
                                                 
3 The impact of production contracts on hog farm performance is explored by Key and McBride.   6 
 
The standard static principle-agent problem is one where a principal (i.e. hog contractor) seeks a 
contract with an agent (i.e. hog grower) that will maximize the principal’s expected utility.  This 
is contingent on the agent undertaking some set of actions to maximize his/her own utility, given 
the compensation scheme and the agent being willing to undertake the contract.  The problem 
has been formally presented by Sheldon, and is presented for hog contracting as follows.  
Suppose the compensation scheme or fee schedule that the contractor pays the grower depends 
only on the output of hogs Q that is observable to both the contractor and grower: 
 
where the function W defines the terms of the contract, often involving a fixed payment per head 
plus a bonus based upon animal performance. Suppose the output Q is a function of both effort 
exerted by the grower e, and some random productivity factor θ : 
 
where θ  represents shocks from such incidents as disease, unfavorable weather, or other disaster 
(i.e. production risk).  The relationship between the contractor and grower can be regarded as a 
two-stage game where the contractor moves first by establishing the payment scheme W, and 
then the grower exerts effort e having learned W.  The grower will exert effort to maximize 
expected utility, which is a direct function of both his fee (positive utility) and effort (negative 
utility): 
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Because the contractor has imperfect information about the grower’s effort, he/she cannot 
determine with certainty whether the level of output resulted from a random event (e.g., disease) 
or lack of effort by the grower. In other words, the contractor cannot infer the effort of the 
grower directly from the outcome, so the contractor must design a payment scheme W(Q) that 
depends only on observable output.  If the grower is risk-averse and is presented with a payment 
scheme based solely on animal performance, the grower is forced to bear all the risk of low 
output and can be expected to under-apply effort.  Alternatively, if the contractor completely 
insures the grower against income risk by offering solely a fixed payment for the grower’s 
services, the grower has no incentive but to minimize his effort
4. The objective of the risk-neutral 
contractor is then to maximize expected returns, recognizing that the payment scheme must 
satisfy both the grower’s incentive compatibility and rationality constraints. 
 
Returns for the contractor are a function of hog output under contract () Q f  and fees paid to the 
grower. The first constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint implying that a grower will 
only undertake optimal effort e* if it is in his/her best interest.  The second constraint is the 
rationality constraint, where U is the grower’s next best opportunity.   
 
                                                 
4 Shavel provides proof of the proposition that for a risk-averse agent, the Pareto optimal fee 
schedule is one where (a) the agent’s payment must depend to some extent on the outcome, but 
(b) the agent never bears all of the risk of an unfavorable outcome. 
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Solution of the optimization model determines the fee schedule that induces optimal effort e* 
which, after resolution of the random shock, results in the observed returns to the contractor and 
the observed grower fees: 
 
This conceptual framework provides the basis for estimating the following equations: 
 
where Π  is the contractor’s returns, net of the fees W paid to the grower. X is a matrix of 
exogenous variables that shift: 1) the contractor’s returns on output  ()⋅ f ; 2) the optimal fee 
schedule  ()⋅ W ; 3) the expected utility of the grower  ()⋅ EU ; 4) the grower’s reservation utility 
U ; and 5) the type and extent of the shock θ . Optimal effort e* is unobservable. However, 
optimal effort is correlated with output productivity – increased effort results in higher output, 
holding other inputs fixed.  Hence, productivity e ~  can be used as a proxy for the optimal effort 
level. The effort put forth by the grower depends on Z, a matrix of variables that influence effort, 
including the payment scheme offered by the contractor. The vectors, 3 2 1   and ,   , ε ε ε are errors that 
may be correlated as discussed below. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data for the analysis comes from a detailed survey of U.S. hog producers conducted in 1998 as 
part of USDA’s annual Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS).  The survey 
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Π = Π  9 
collected information about hog production arrangements and performance, hog costs of 
production, and the farm financial status.  On hog contracting operations, the survey collected 
specific data on the costs and returns of the grower and the contractor, the type of contractor, the 
nature of the contract arrangement, and characteristics of the grower and the grower’s operation.  
Data on 248 operations finishing hogs under contract were used in the analysis. 
  
In order to estimate the general model specified in (6a-c) for hog contracting operations, a 
measure of effort exerted by the grower was needed.  Quantifying effort in terms of hours and 
animal husbandry was not possible from the survey data.  Instead, the rate of feed conversion 
achieved on the operations, measured as pounds of feed fed per pound of gain, was used to 
quantify effort.  Hog contractors often base performance bonuses on feed conversion relative to a 
standard, and it has been used in other studies to evaluate performance payments and risk sharing 
in hog contracting (Johnson and Foster; Martin).  However, a problem with using feed 
conversion to estimate contractor and grower net returns is that they are determined jointly, 
which if left uncorrected, would result in simultaneous equation bias.  Feed conversion directly 
affects contractor returns by lowering input costs, and can directly influence grower returns 
through the incentive mechanism.  Thus the error terms in (6a-c) may be correlated.  This 
problem was overcome by estimating (6c) with feed conversion as the measure of effort and 
using the predicted value of feed conversion as an instrument in estimating (6a) and (6b).  
Parameter estimates obtained from this specification are both consistent and free of simultaneous 
equation bias. 
   10 
Independent variables specified in the effort equation (6c) included those describing the payment 
scheme offered by the contractor, contract characteristics, and characteristics of the grower and 
the grower’s operation (table 1).  The payment scheme was specified using binary variables 
indicating whether the grower was paid a fixed amount, a fixed amount with an incentive bonus, 
or according to a profit sharing incentive.  Payment schemes with performance incentives were 
expected to increase grower effort.  Contract characteristics included contract size, binary 
variables for whether the contractor provided feed to the operation and monitored animal health, 
and the placement and removal hog weights.  Grower characteristics were specified as indicators 
of the managerial time and ability of the grower, and included grower experience, education, and 
a binary variable that indicated if the grower’s major occupation was off-farm employment.  
Also included was the degree to which the grower’s operation was specialized in hog production 
and the age of the grower’s production facilities
5. 
 
Financial performance equations for the contractor (6a) and grower (6b) were estimated using 
gross returns net of operating and asset ownership costs, excluding land and unpaid labor, as the 
dependent variable. Since the contractor owns and sells the final product, gross returns of the 
contractor were defined by the value of the finished hogs
6.  Gross returns of the grower were 
mainly the fees paid by the contractor for grower services, which is a cost to the contractor. 
                                                 
5 The genetic capability of the hogs would also have a significant impact on their feed 
conversion.  However, the genetic capability of hogs is very difficult to quantify and was not 
available from the survey data. 
6 Actual market hog price received by the contractor was not collected in the ARMS and so State 
average prices were used to value the finished hogs.  This “spot market” cash price is likely to be 
less than what many contractors received under marketing arrangements with packers.  However, 
this method of valuing the hog production should not affect the analysis of the contract 
arrangement since the contractor typically bears all of the price risk in these type of 
arrangements (Rhodes; Knoeber and Thurman).   11 
Other costs, including feed, other variable inputs, and capital, were charged to each participant 
according to their contribution.  A detailed breakdown of the average costs contributed by 
growers’ and contractors’ are shown in table 2.  Contractors’ incurred nearly all the operating 
costs by providing the feed and feeder pigs, while growers’ paid for most of the fuel and 
electricity, repairs, and hired labor.  Growers’ main costs were the ownership costs associated 
with the production facilities. 
 
Regressors specified in the performance equations included the type of contractor, years under 
contract with the current contractor, services provided by the contractor, and characteristics of 
the grower and the grower’s operation.  A set of binary variables were used to specify the 
services provided by the contractor as part of the arrangement, including whether the contractor 
provided facility financing, provided facility specifications, monitored animal health, and/or 
provided planning and other assistance with manure management. Also included were variables 
for whether the grower was located in North Carolina where hog contracting first gained 
widespread use, and grower effort, as indicated by the predicted feed conversion from (6c). 
 
The parameters of equations (6a-c) were estimated with the ARMS survey weights using 
weighted ordinary least squares.  Due to the complex design of the ARMS sample, standard 
errors were estimated using a jackknife replication approach (Dubman, 2000). 
 
Results 
Parameter estimates for the equation used to describe the effort exerted by growers are shown in 
table 3.  Feed conversion, measured as pounds of feed fed per pound of gain, was used to   12 
approximate grower effort.  A negative parameter estimate implies that an increase in the 
explanatory variable results in less feed being fed per pound of gain, and thus an improved feed 
conversion.  Using a fixed payment scheme with a bonus incentive lowered feed conversion 
relative to a strictly fixed payment scheme.  This implies that this incentive mechanism was 
positively correlated with grower effort, as postulated in the principle-agent framework.  
However, the profit sharing incentive did not significantly impact feed conversion.  Principle-
agent theory suggests that a profit sharing incentive may shift more risk to growers who are risk-
averse than is optimal to induce effort. 
 
The negative coefficients on size of contract and grower experience means that increasing these 
items improves feed conversion, an indication of greater grower effort.  Grower effort could be 
expected to increase with size of the contract because the grower has a greater financial stake in 
the outcome on larger operations. Grower experience may be an indicator of the grower’s 
husbandry and/or managerial ability, and thus quality of the effort.  Feed conversion also 
improved if the contractor provided the feed, possibly because contractors used higher quality 
feed items or because contractors were better at matching feed composition with animal 
nutritional requirements over the life of the animal. Feed conversion was expected to increase 
with animal weights because animal physiology dictates that with all else being equal, more feed 
is required to add gain at greater hog weights. Higher placement weights were associated with a 
higher feed conversion, but greater removal weights lowered feed conversion.  Differences in the 
genetic capability of the hogs may have influenced this relationship. 
   13 
Parameter estimates for the financial performance equations for growers and contractors are 
shown in table 4.  The grower model explained 25 percent of the variation in the net returns of 
growers, while the contractor model explained 41 percent of the variation in contractor returns.  
Several explanatory variables were significant in both models. 
 
Contractor type and location were included as shifters in the financial performance equations. 
Estimates on the variables for contractor type indicate that contractors who were integrators had 
significantly higher net returns, about $10 per hundredweight, than did vertically integrated 
contractors and other farmers. Growers for integrators had significantly lower net returns than 
did those for vertically integrated firms, about $3 less per hundredweight.  Integrators have 
generally been in the business of hog contracting longer than the other contractor types and are 
the most specialized type of hog contractor.  This experience and specialization in hog 
production may have enhanced their ability to design contracts that extract more of the economic 
surplus from these business arrangements. 
 
Most of the variables describing the contract arrangement had a significant impact on financial 
performance, although in some cases the impacts differed for the contractor and grower.  
Contract size was associated with higher returns per unit for growers, but not contractors.  Since 
growers bear nearly all of the fixed facility costs, larger contracts allow them to spread these 
fixed costs over more units of production.  This is probably why facility capacity utilization was 
also positively related to grower returns. 
   14 
Increasing the length of time that growers were with contractors had a positive impact on 
contractor returns, but decreased grower returns.  Contractor returns increased about 40 cents per 
hundredweight for each year the grower was under contract, while grower returns declined by 
about 21 cents each year.  This suggests that contract terms may have changed over time in favor 
of the contractor. Also, older production facilities were associated with lower contractor returns.  
Technological advances in the design of hog production facilities improve animal productivity, 
making older facilities less efficient.  Contractor returns fell by about 69 cents per 
hundredweight each year that the grower facilities aged. 
 
The services provided by contractors also impacted both grower and contractor financial 
performance.  Both growers and contractors had lower returns when the contractor provided 
financing for the facilities.  However, the provision of facility specifications by the contractor 
resulted in higher net returns for the grower, but lower returns for the contractor. Contractors 
earned about $7 less per hundredweight when they provided the facility designs, while grower 
returns were more than $3 higher.  Providing plans or assistance for manure management was 
also associated with lower contractor returns, about $3 less per hundredweight.  
 
Among grower characteristics, greater formal education improved returns to the grower but had a 
negative impact on contractor returns.  For each year of grower education, grower returns 
increased by nearly $1 per hundredweight, while contractor returns fell by almost $2. Grower 
specialization in hog production also enhanced grower returns.  However, grower effort, as 
approximated by feed conversion, did not have a significant impact on grower returns but was 
significant to the contractor. Nearly half of the contracts examined in this study were based on   15 
fixed payments without a bonus mechanism.  Principal-agent theory suggests that these contracts 
lack an incentive structure that promotes grower effort. The negative coefficient on grower effort 
in the contractor equation indicates that contractor returns increased as grower effort lowered the 
pounds of feed fed per pound of gain.  Evaluating this result at the mean feed conversion level 
indicates that contractor returns increased by nearly 5 percent for a percentage improvement in 




A primary source of potential conflict in the hog contract arrangement appears to be how 
contract terms may change over time. Contract growers are required to make a substantial 
investment in production facilities.  At the average size of the grower operations examined in this 
study, more than 5,000 head produced annually, the investment in production facilities would 
likely range from $250,000 to $500,000 depending upon building design and geographic 
location. An investment of this magnitude generally takes a grower 8-12 years to recover.  
However, average contract duration is usually about 2-3 years (Grimes and Rhodes). Therefore, 
contract terms could be redefined several times during the capital recovery period.  Oftentimes 
growers have few alternatives to the contract offered.  This means that growers are vulnerable to 
contract terms that change in favor of the contractor. Evidence from this study suggests that 
contractors may have used their relatively stronger bargaining position at contract renewal in 
order to extract concessions from growers. 
   16 
Another source of potential conflict in the contract arrangement concerns services provided by 
the contractor.  Contractors appear to have a disincentive to provide most of the services 
examined in this study, including facility financing and design, and assistance with manure 
management. Growers appear to benefit from having specific requirements from contractors 
regarding the production facilities.  Once the contractor specifies this information, it may be 
more difficult to later alter contract terms. Providing plans or assistance for manure management 
was also associated with lower contractor returns.  Incorporating these terms into the contract 
may require contractors to fully or partially absorb any costs associated with additional 
regulations on manure management.  
 
Education appears to be means by which growers strengthen their position in the contract 
arrangement relative to contractors.  Contractors are typically endowed with nearly all of the 
bargaining power in contract arrangements and are often able to make “take-it-or-leave-it” offers 
to growers. Education may enhance the bargaining ability of growers by helping to identify 
contract terms that have the most influence on returns.  More education may also encourage 
growers to utilize other sources of support, such as extension or legal advice, in order to ensure 
that contract terms are fair. 
 
The results of this study suggest that there may be a role for public policy in ensuring that 
production contract arrangements are conducted fairly.  Issues about contract duration and 
contract terms appear to be important determinants of contractor and grower success. Moreover, 
these issues appear to be sources of disagreement in the contractor-grower relationship.  Growers 
without meaningful alternatives as contracts come up for renewal are vulnerable to pressure from   17 
contractors to accept terms that would not be acceptable were competition present.  As the 
industry becomes more concentrated among fewer and larger operations, growers will become 
more vulnerable to the market power of contractors. 
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Table 1. Mean values of the variables used in the model, 1998 
Variable Unit  Mean 
Contractor type:     
  Integrator  Percent of farms  31 
  Vertically integrated firm  Percent of farms  44 
  Other farmer  Percent of farms  25 
Contract payment scheme:     
  Fixed  Percent of farms  46 
  Fixed plus bonus  Percent of farms  42 
  Profit sharing  Percent of farms  12 
Contract size  Head removed per year (X100)  5.23 
Contract years  Years with contractor  4.35 
Contractor service:     
  Facility financing  Percent of farms  5 
  Facility specifications  Percent of farms  39 
  Provides feed  Percent of farms  88 
  Monitoring herd health  Percent of farms  73 
  Manure management  Percent of farms  39 
Animal weights:     
  Placement weight  Pounds  44 
  Removal weight  Pounds  251 
Grower experience  Years producing hogs  14.75 
Grower education  Years of formal schooling  12.95 
Grower non-farm occupation  Percent of farms  23 
Grower in North Carolina  Percent of farms  20 
Grower specialization in hogs  Percent of production value from hogs  66 
Facility age  Years  9.55 
Facility capacity utilization  Head removed per head of capacity  2.21 
Feed conversion  Pounds of feed fed per pound of gain  2.42 
 
 
   20 
Table 2. Estimated costs and returns for participants in feeder-pig to finish contract 
arrangements, 1998 
Item Grower  Contractror 
  Dollars per cwt gain 
Gross returns:     
  Market hogs  1.70  37.46 
  Contract fees  4.87  - 
  Other income
1 0.83  1.17 
    Total gross returns  7.40  38.63 
    
Operating costs:     
  Feed  1.09  18.37 
  Feeder pigs  0.59  14.55 
  Veterinary and medicine  0.02  0.19 
  Marketing  0.07  0.95 
  Custom services and supplies  0.08  0.31 
  Fuel, lubrication, and electricity  0.53  0.05 
  Repairs  0.26  0.01 
  Contract fees  -  4.87 
  Hired labor  0.34  0.00 
  Operating capital  0.07  0.82 
    Total operating costs  3.08  40.12 
Ownership costs:     
  Depreciation and interest
2 5.66  0.00 
  Taxes and insurance  0.26  0.02 
    Total ownership costs  5.91  0.02 
    
Total operating and ownership costs  8.99  40.14 
Gross returns less operating and ownership costs  -1.59  -1.51 
1Other income includes other hog sales (feeder pigs, cull stock, etc.) and the value of the 
inventory change on the operation during 1998. 
2Computed using the capital recovery method.  21 
Table 3. Regression results for the effort exerted by growers in the feeder pig-to-finish 









Intercept -  12.3844**  4.6406 
Payment scheme
1:  Fixed payment plus bonus  -0.4163*  0.2292 
 Profit  sharing  -0.3413  0.1964 
Contract size  Head removed per year  -0.0042**  0.0016 
Contract years  Years with contractor  0.0070  0.0050 
Contractor service:  Provides feed  -0.8118**  0.4053 
  Monitoring herd health  -0.0430  0.0313 
Animal weights  Placement weight  0.0384**  0.0154 
 Removal  weight  -0.0356**  0.0136 
Grower experience  Years producing hogs  -0.0288**  0.0140 
Grower education  Years of schooling  -0.0431  0.0273 
Grower occupation  Off-farm employment  -0.0355  0.0266 
Grower specialize  Farm value from hogs  -0.0036  0.0025 
Facility age  Years  0.0023  0.0017 
      
R-squared -  0.13   
Notes: Effort was defined by feed conversion measured by pounds of feed fed per pound of gain. 
1Coefficients interpreted relative to the deleted group, fixed payment scheme. 
Single and double asterisks (*) denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Using the jackknife variance estimator with 15 replicates means that the critical t-values are 
2.145 at the 5% level, and 1.761 and the 10% level.   22 
Table 4. Regression results for the financial performance of contractors and growers in 
feeder pig-to-finish contract arrangements, 1998 
   Grower  Contractor 
Variable  Description  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 
Intercept -  -23.3221**  7.6864  44.5904**  15.9601 
Contractor type
1: Vertically  integrated  3.5116** 1.4218  -10.0703** 4.3859 
 Other  farmer  0.5826  0.4098  -9.4029**  4.3853 
Location North  Carolina  0.9046  0.5798  -4.9412  3.0473 
Contract size  Head removed per year  0.0113*  0.0060  -0.0075  0.0052 
Contract years  Years with contractor  -0.2071*  0.1173  0.4148**  0.1856 
Contractor service:  Facility financing  -2.2560*  1.0561  -6.1377**  2.9352 
 Facility  specifications  3.2188**  1.3723  -7.3251**  3.0550 
  Monitoring herd health  -0.7625  0.5629  -0.0585  0.0438 
 Manure  management  -0.0198  0.0148  -3.0089*  1.5934 
Facility age  Years  -0.0563  0.0342  -0.6877**  0.2499 
Capacity utilized  Hd removed / hd space  0.5757**  0.1988  1.1657**  0.3608 
Grower experience  Years producing hogs  0.0309  0.0217  0.0553  0.0376 
Grower education  Years of schooling  0.9841**  0.4315  -1.8072**  0.5810 
Grower occupation  Off-farm employment  -0.1555  0.1132  -1.9207  1.1823 
Grower specialize  Farm value from hogs  0.0477*  0.0238  -0.0249  0.0156 
Grower effort  Feed conversion
2 0.0786  0.0562  -2.9182**  1.1278 
          
R-squared -  0.25    0.41   
Notes: Financial performance was defined as returns above the operating and ownership costs 
per hundredweight of gain for each participant (see table 2). 
1Coefficients interpreted relative to the deleted group, integrators. 
2Predicted value from effort equation 
Single and double asterisks (*) denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Using the jackknife variance estimator with 15 replicates means that the critical t-values are 
2.145 at the 5% level, and 1.761 and the 10% level. 
 